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Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against
All Odds: Major Mori and the Legal
Team for David Hicks at Guantanamo
Bay
Ellen Yaroshefsky*
David Hicks, an Australian citizen, was detained in
Afghanistan in December of 2001 and brought to Guant~namo
Bay (Gitmo) in January of 2002. He was denied access to military
and civilian lawyers for nearly two years, but eventually was
permitted to have counsel only because the government believed
that a lawyer would help secure a guilty plea,' and David agreed
not to discuss the conditions of his captivity. 2 Eventually, more
than five years later, and as a consequence of an international
political campaign, he was charged and pleaded guilty to material
support of terrorism for his association with al Qaeda operatives
in Afghanistan. He was the first Guant6namo detainee to have
his case presented to a military commission. He obtained an
agreed-upon lenient sentence, served an additional six months,
and was returned to Australia. He is now out of custody with
* Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Jacob Burns Ethics Center,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I thank Peter Margulies and the Roger
Williams University School of Law for organizing an engaging conference and
inviting my participation. I thank Sophia Brill, a future law student, for her
invaluable assistance.
1. Interview with Joshua Dratel, President, Joshua L. Dratel, P.C., in
N.Y., N.Y. (Jun. 2007).
2. Raymond Bonner, Australian Parents Have New Hope for U.S.-
Detained Son, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at A8. For a thorough analysis of
the proceedings against Hicks, see LEX LASRY, THE UNITED STATES V. DAVID
MATTHEW HICKS: FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT OBSERVER FOR THE LAW
COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA (2004), available at
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shared/2440377524.pdf.
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restrictions that remain in force for one year from the date of
sentence; the most notable restriction is that he will not speak
publicly about the conditions of confinement.
This essay describes the remarkable lawyering on behalf of
David Hicks and demonstrates that zealous and strategic
advocacy in the face of severe constraints can result in a
successful resolution, even in a fundamentally unfair system.
Operating within a structure of ad hoc procedures designed to
produce guilty verdicts (termed a "rigged system" by many
observers 3), Hicks' lawyers engaged in advocacy using a carefully
coordinated legal, political, and media strategy that remained
fine-tuned as the legal and political landscape shifted. Despite
their firm and continual stance that the system was unauthorized
by law and fundamentally unjust, Hicks's lawyers successfully
maneuvered that system for their client's benefit. This essay
focuses upon Hicks's most visible and publicly touted attorney,
Major Michael "Dan" Mori of the Marine Corps.4
Military lawyers are not typically perceived as being among
the "brave band" of lawyers and others who go to the edge of the
law for a "cause."5 Yet, in this and many other cases, military
lawyers were often at the edge of the law because zealous
representation of their clients demanded such action. 6 Their jobs
3. Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The
Case of the Military Commissions, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375 (2005).
4. Hicks was represented by a number of military and civilian lawyers
at various stages during the five years of his confinement. U.S. Military
lawyers included Jeffery D. Lippert (2003-2005), and Rebecca Snyder (2006-
2007). Australian attorneys include Steve Kenny (2003-2005), David McLeod
and Michael Griffin (2006-2008). Joshua Dratel, discussed throughout this
essay, was, along with Mori, a principal strategist and zealous advocate
throughout the representation.
5. Lawyers for the Center for Constitutional Rights filed the first legal
challenge to the Guantdnamo detentions when it was highly unpopular to do
so. See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 54-55 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006); AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
(1998); Adam Liptak & Michael Janofsky, Scrappy Group of Lawyers Shows
Way for Big Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at A14; Philip Shenon, Suit To
Be Filed on Behalf of Three Detainees in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at
All.
6. Before 2003, military lawyers were summarily fired for refusing to
comply with the conditions imposed upon their representation of
Guantdnamo prisoners. See, e.g., James Meek, US Fires Guantdnamo
Defence Team, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 3, 2003,
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forced them to confront profound ethical dilemmas, rarely
confronted by their civilian counterparts. While lawyers in all
terrorism-related cases face significant challenges in their ability
to represent their clients diligently, competently and zealously,
the limitations on representation before military commissions
after 9/11 are unparalleled in United States history. 7 Under such
a military commission system, Mori and other military lawyers
were often unable to obtain evidence or share it with their clients.
They were subject to a panoply of other restrictions that would be
unthinkable in a typical court martial or case or courtroom in the
United States.
8
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/03/Guantinamo.usa. See also
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military Lawyering at the Edge of the Rule of Law in
Guantdnamo: Should Lawyers Be Permitted To Violate the Law?, 37 HOFSTRA
L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing representation at Guantinamo by
Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift, Lieutenant Commander Matthew
Diaz, and Major Michael Mori).
7. There is an expanding literature about challenges to ethical
lawyering in terrorism cases in federal courts, courts martial, and military
commissions. See generally Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a
Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism
Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 81 (2003-2004); Joshua L. Dratel,
Sword or Shield? The Government's Selective Use of Its Declassification
Authority for Tactical Advantage in Criminal Prosecutions, 5 CARDOZO PUB.
L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 171 (2006); Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of
Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist
Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173 (2003); Abbe Smith, The Bounds of Zeal in
Criminal Defense: Some Thoughts on Lynn Stewart, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 31
(2002); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Introduction to Symposium, Secret Evidence and
the Courts in the Age of National Security, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS
J. 1 (2006). See also David Luban, "The Vindication of Michael Mori,"
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/vindication-of-
majormori.html (April 1, 2007) (last visited May 15, 2008) (discussing the
conflict of interest that arises when military defense lawyers are threatened
with prosecution); Ben Wizner, "A Tailor-Made Guilty Plea," ACLU Blog,
http:/Iblog.aclu.org/index.php?/archives/159-A-Tailor-Made-Guilty-Plea.html
(March 27, 2007) (last visited May 15, 2008) (discussing Hicks defense
attorney Josh Dratel's refusal to sign a commitment for compliance with the
Guantdnamo Military Commissions' rules). See also United States v. Reid,
214 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002) (striking down requirement that defense
lawyers sign onto SAM's as a precondition for access to their client); Saudi
Convicted in Embassy Bombing Sues, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002 (on the
monitoring of attorney-client communications in over a dozen cases). For a
riveting account of GTMO lawyering, see generally CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH,
EIGHT O'CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN
GUANTANAMO BAY (2007).
8. One "glaring condition" of the military commissions noted by the
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These commissions were so fundamentally flawed that in
June 2006 the Supreme Court would find in its landmark
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision that they were both in violation of
the Uniform Military Code of Justice and Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. 9  It found that specific flaws of structure and
procedure included the admissibility of hearsay and other
evidence gained through coercion, and the fact that the defendant
could be barred from hearing all evidence against him or even be
barred from his own trial. The Court found that the
[commissions] were not "regularly constituted courts" as
understood by the Geneva Conventions.
10
In 2003, a team of lawyers including Mori believed the
military commissions to be fundamentally flawed, but they could
not be assured of vindication by a court. It would be three years
before the commissions would be struck down by the U.S.
Supreme Court and replaced by yet another roundly criticized
system. The Hicks team had a client to represent with the goal of
his return to his native country.
This essay traces the lawyering of Major Mori and the Hicks
team beginning in 2003, when it was an uphill struggle even to
secure a hearing. It necessarily details, in chronological order, the
defense team's legal, political, and media strategy in confronting a
government that claimed, as it still does today, that it could
Supreme Court in its Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision is that "[t]he accused and
his civilian counsel may be excluded from, and precluded from ever learning
what evidence was presented during, any part of the proceeding that either
the Appointing Authority or the presiding officer decides to 'close."' Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 614 (2006). See also Reply to Opposition to
Petition for Rehearing app. at iv, Al Odah v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067
(2007) (No. 06-1196) [hereinafter Abraham] (Declaration of Stephen
Abraham), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
Al%200dah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf.
9. 548 U.S. 577, 577. The ruling states that Hamdan's military
commission "lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures
violate both the [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and the Geneva
Conventions." Id. at 567.
10. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham, a Judge Advocate General
officer who had submitted a declaration in a previous suit in 2002, stated
that, in [their proceedings], "[wihat were purported to be specific statements
of fact lacked even the most fundamental earmarks of objectively credible
evidence." Abraham, supra note 8, at vi. Moreover, Lt. Colonel Abraham
noted that there was pressure from above to reach an "enemy combatant"
verdict in the tribunals, which were often composed of personnel with limited
or no intelligence experience. Id. at vii.
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indefinitely hold detainees without access to a hearing or trial;
and it addresses the ethics issues these lawyers confronted in
ultimately securing an extremely favorable resolution for David
Hicks.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
David Hicks, a twenty-four year old Australian national, had
a fairly mundane background and history for a man described by
President George W. Bush's administration as among "the worst
of the worst."11  Born and raised in Adelaide, Australia, Hicks
would later be described as a "wanderlust in search of a
purpose." 12 He did poorly in school and got expelled for trouble
with drinking and drugs. He drifted around Australia, working a
number of jobs, including stints as a kangaroo skinner and a hand
on cattle ranches. He tried to join the Australian army but was
rejected. After fathering two children with an aboriginal woman,
he set off to travel the world.13 He went to Japan where he did
very little except watch television. One of the ironies of his
circumstances was that the only English language television
station was CNN International which covered extensively the
Balkan wars between the Serbs and Kosovars. This was the first
time that David Hicks became interested in international affairs
and his own brand of heroism:
I just had something inside that said I had to go and do
that, like a spur of the moment sort of thing .... I found
out there was one group ... training in northern Albania.
11. Katty Kay, No Fast Track at Guantdnamo Bay, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2648547.stm (quote attributed
generally to U.S. officials); Some Guantdnamo Prisoners Will Be Freed,
Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A14; Neil A. Lewis & Eric
Schmitt, Cuba Detentions May Last Years, NYTIMES.COM, Feb. 13, 2004,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9AO6E5D8113AF930A25751
COA9629C8B63&scp=l&sq=cuba+detentions+may+last+years&st=nyt). An
admiral quoted in a Defense Department press release said, "They are the
worst of the worst, and if let out in the street, they will go back to the
proclivity of trying to kill Americans and others." Linda D. Kozaryn, U.S.
Gains Custody of More Detainees, DEFENSELINK, Jan. 28, 2002,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43813.
12. Raymond Bonner, Australia Terrorism Detainee Leaves Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at A7.
13. Id.
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They were going into Kosovo and I realised that maybe,
at a wild guess, I could go there and try it and I did it. To
me that was doing the impossible. 14
In 1999 Hicks went to Albania, joined the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) and completed their basic military training.' 5 By the
time Hicks got to Albania, the war was nearly over and he was
sent home when the peace accord was in place. When he returned
to Australia, he began to investigate and later convert to Islam.
He soon left Australia for Pakistan with names of contacts to
travel around Asia. 16 Traveling to Afghanistan, he was invited to
attend an Al Qaeda training camp. Beginning in January of 2001,
he trained at various Al Qaeda camps. He spouted anti-U.S.
rhetoric, supporting the Taliban. He claimed he met Osama bin
Laden more than twenty times.17  He left Afghanistan on
September 9, 2001, went to Pakistan to visit a friend, and watched
the 9/11 attacks on television. 18 He had no advance knowledge of
the 9/11 attacks. 19 He later told the Australian Federal Police,
"It's not Islam, is it? It's like the opposite of what I was . . .
wanted to do. Meant to help the people, stop oppression. And
they did the opposite."20
On September 12, 2001, Hicks decided to return to
Afghanistan. He later said that he wanted to gather his
belongings. "It might sound stupid, but I've got lots of nice Islamic
clothes I'd been saving. There's lots of money in them with stuff I
could have had home." Had he not gone back, he says, "I would
have lost my Islam."21
Once in Afghanistan, Hicks joined Al Qaeda forces in the
Kandahar airport. He was given an automatic rifle and, in
14. Debbie Whitmont, The Case of David Hicks, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP.,
Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/s1494795.htm.
15. See LASRY, supra note 2, 6.51 (these facts-stipulated to by the
prosecution and defense-were the basis for David Hicks's ultimate guilty
plea).
16. David Hicks: Nothing but an Echo, CLARK CMTY NETWORK, Jan. 22,
2007, http://securingamerica.com/ccn/node/10638 [hereinafter Nothing but an
Echo].
17. He later told Australian federal police that he was "just trying to
make himself sound important by boasting." Id.
18. See LASRY, supra note 2, 9.4.
19. Id.
20. Whitmont, supra note 14.
21. Id.
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October 2001, sent to guard a Taliban tank.22 After moving to
other locations with Al Qaeda forces, he decided to leave the
country for Pakistan when the United States closed the borders.
He sold his weapons to pay for a taxi to Pakistan. 23 He was
picked up by the Northern Alliance 24 which sold him to the United
States for several thousand dollars.25
Hicks was held on a Navy ship and then blindfolded and
taken by chopper to an unknown place for interrogation. He
claimed that he was brutally beaten and tortured.26 In January
2002, he was brought to Guantdnamo Bay, where the United
States claimed that he and others could be held indefinitely
without charge. 27  His treatment was severe, but less so than
other detainees-David was white, Australian, and spoke
English.28 He became the first plaintiff in what ultimately
became the landmark case of Rasul v. Bush, which established
that Guantdnamo detainees had the right to judicial review of
their detention. 29
In December, 2003, nearly two years after his capture, Hicks
was referred for a military commission. The authorities believed
that Hicks would plead guilty, thereby legitimating the
commissions. 30 They permitted him access to counsel solely for
the purpose of entry of a guilty plea. 3 1
22. LASRY, supra note 2, 6.64.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 46-49.
25. Bonner, supra note 12.
26. "New Evidence" Backs Hicks's Torture Claim, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP.,
Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1494779.htm
(citing August 5, 2004 affidavit filed by David Hicks's attorneys).
27. LASRY, supra note 2, at 3, 5 (citing the United States government's
position in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,466 (2004)).
28. Whitmont, supra note 14.
29. Hicks was represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights and
its cooperating attorney, Joseph Margulies. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
30. Interview of Maj. Michael Dan Mori, United States Marine Corps, in
N.Y., N.Y. (May 3, 2007).
31. See infra note 39.
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LAWYERING IN THE "LEGAL BLACK HOLE"
3 2
Major Michael Dan Mori of the U.S. Marine Corps is a now-
celebrated military officer who was detailed to represent David
Hicks.33 In June 2003 Mori returned from his station in Hawaii to
do so. Hicks was also represented by FAC (Foreign Attorney
Consultant) Australian attorney Steve Kenny.34
Mori entered the case in a "court martial mindset. ' '35  He
expected that rules and procedures would be fair and that he
would be able to obtain the facts and apply the law as he had been
trained in the JAG corps to understand it. He was sorely
surprised as he got into the commission system. The entire
structure of the military commissions was, as he put it, "set up
with a vested interest in convictions."36 There was no
independent judge; hearsay was permitted, as was evidence
32. The press uses this term extensively. See, e.g., Editorial: A Legal
Black Hole; Guantdnamo Detainees Deserve Habeas Relief, L.A. TIMES, May 1,
2007; Editorial: Black Hole: By Stripping Detainees of Legal Rights, U.S. Has
Created a Judicial Conundrum, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 8, 2007.
33. This was Mori's sole assignment for nearly four years until the case
was resolved. Mori traveled to Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Australia nearly ten
times to conduct investigations and engage in other activities on behalf of
Hicks.
34. The FAC's were essentially Australian equivalents of military Judge
Advocate General (JAG) officers and were allowed to "consult" with Hicks,
subject to the U.S. Defense Department's rules on security restrictions. For
the Defense Department's outline of these rules, see Press Release, United
States Department of Defense, U.S. and Austrailia announce agreements on
Guantdnamo Detainees (Nov. 25 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=5818. The types
of pressures and constraints imposed on Hicks's American lawyers were
echoed, if not amplified, for their Australian counterparts. Australian
attorneys McLeod and Griffin, who replaced Kenny in 2005, had to sign
lengthy agreements with the U.S. military including a provision saying that
they would be extradited to the U.S. for prosecution if they were found to be
violating commission rules on classified information. Kenny had signed a
similar document in 2003, but was able to get the extradition clause taken
out. McLeod said of the agreement, "I've never seen anything like it. It goes
on for pages. It was very intimidating but the problem was, if you didn't
agree to sign it, you weren't going to get access to David Hicks." Fenella
Souter, Keep Quiet or Face Extradition to the U.S.: Hicks Lawyers Made To
Sign Gag Order, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 23, 2006,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/keep-quiet-or-face-extradition-to-us-
hicks-lawyers-made-to-signgag-order/2006/0922/1158431897922.html.
35. Mori Interview, supra note 30.
36. Id.
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obtained under coercion. Attorney client conversations could be
monitored.37 As Mori said:
Stepping into it, I thought I was going to be involved in
courts martial. I have plenty of experience dealing with
court martials and that's the laws we would be using.
Unfortunately what I found out [was] that we were in
something different, something completely made up and
resurrected from 1492.38
As many lawyers recognized, "basically there were no rules.
They made them up as they went along."39 The highly respected
Independent Observer for the Law Council of Australia, who was
a former justice on the Supreme Court of Victoria, would later call
these "ad hoc" procedures and term the ultimate proceedings
"shambolic."40  Critical flaws included: (1) a person could be
convicted based on secret evidence and summary evidence; (2)
"evidence" could be based on rank hearsay (e.g., interrogators
reading statements from other detainees whether obtained
through abuse, coercion or torture) and without any defense
access to those witnesses; (3) military officers were the judges and
juries and the rules for who served on the judicial panels were
arbitrary; (4) judges on the panel other than the presiding judge
need not be lawyers; (5) civilian counsel could not readily gain
access to the accused, witnesses, and evidence; (6) attorney client
discussions could be monitored; and (7) counsel was restricted
from speaking to the press.41
Representation before such a body presented the most
profound of ethical dilemmas. How could a lawyer represent
anyone in such a system? This was a front burner issue for the
criminal defense bar, particularly just after March 2002 when the
procedures for the operation of the commissions were established
37. Id.
38. Transcript from an interview with Maj. Mori on Enough Rope, with
Andrew Denton, Australian Broadcasing Corporation, (Aug. 14 2006)
available at http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/s1709428.htm.
39. Interview with attorney Joshua L. Dratel, in N. Y., N.Y. (Jun. & Nov.
2007) and Interview with attorney Joshua L. Dratel, in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 2007) [hereinafter Dratel Interviews].
40. LASRY, supra note 2, 5.64.
41. See Dratel Interview, supra note 39; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
577, 614. See also Abraham, supra note 8; note 42, below.
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by the Secretary of Defense. 42 Significantly, in August 2003, the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
issued an Ethics Opinion declaring that it was unethical for a
civilian lawyer to represent a detainee before the commissions
with procedures that deny fundamental due process. 43  Mori,
however, was detailed to represent Hicks. Mori and Steve Kenny
visited him in December 2003. The appointing authority
permitted this attorney client meeting solely for the purpose of
discussing a plea bargain and imposed restrictions on Mori's
ability to speak about the case with the media. Despite the press's
intense interest in the Hicks case, Mori did not make public
statements. He was cautious. 44
Mori had no experience in cases involving the law of war. He
sought assistance. Shortly after this first Guantdnamo visit,
civilian defense attorney, Joshua Dratel, joined the Hicks defense
team. 45  Dratel, then co-chair of the NACDL committee on
military tribunals, was a highly respected civilian criminal
defense lawyer who had handled the "embassy bombing" case in
New York and marshaled expertise on terrorism cases. 46 He had
previously obtained security clearance and thus, was readily
available to consult with Hicks. 47
The government attempted to impose restrictions on Dratel's
representation of Hicks-the precise terms that led to the NACDL
Ethics Opinion that it was unethical to represent Gitmo detainees.
42. See Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-
United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. § 9 (2008).
The military commissions were created by Presidential Order on Nov. 13,
2001. See Press Release, The White House, President Issues Military Order
(Nov. 13, 2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html. See also Williams Michael, Jr. &
Joseph Margulies, Trying Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 59 BENCH
& B. MINN. 20 (Feb. 2002).
43. Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 03-
04 (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/ethicso
pinions/$file/ethicsop_03-04.pdf. See Cheh, supra note 3; see also Lasry,
supra note 2.
44. Mori Interview, supra note 30.
45. "Civilian defense counsel" are private lawyers who apply to and must
be approved by the Office of Military Commissions Chief Defense Counsel to
defend detainees (along with military counsel) in the commissions.
46. See U.S. v. Bin Laden, 160 F. Supp. 2d 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
47. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
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It presented Dratel with an affidavit that required him to
acknowledge that his attorney-client consultations could be
monitored, that all of his work on the case had to be completed at
Guantdnamo, and that the defense team would not include
consultants. Dratel refused to sign. The government then
negotiated the terms of the affidavit. Two days later, it withdrew
nearly all conditions. The government backed down because it
wanted Dratel to consult Hicks so the guilty plea could be
secured.48
Dratel and Mori visited Hicks on January 9, 2004. 49 No
doubt, this case was unique and could not be treated like any
other criminal case where a lawyer seeks to discuss disposition of
criminal charges. On the one hand, the lawyers believed that a
plea bargain might, as the government hoped, provide some
legitimacy to the commission system and Hicks's detention.50
They were loathe to serve as justification for this system. On the
other hand, they were zealous advocates for an individual client,
and as any zealous defense lawyer in a criminal case, had to
discuss the potential benefit of a plea bargain. 51 The lawyers
acknowledged this classic potential conflict, discussed it, and then
proceeded to discuss plea bargaining with Hicks. Of course, as
48. Id. The affidavit, known as Annex B, also contained a condition that
defense counsel acknowledged that he would not be present during a hearing
on the use of classified information. Dratel ultimately signed an affidavit
that indicated that he could challenge his lack of presence at such a hearing.
49. Dratel Interview, supra note 39. Dratel was the first civilian lawyer
permitted access to a client at Guantdnamo Bay.
50. The government, expecting that a plea bargain with terms
prohibiting Hicks from talking about conditions of his confinement, hoped
this information would not become public knowledge. Dratel Interview,
supra note 39. See p.492 infra regarding conditions of Hick's ultimate plea
bargain.
51. This potential conflict between the lawyer's representation of an
individual client and the lawyer's personal and political goals-often termed
"cause lawyering"-was hardly unique. Criminal defense lawyers confront
such potential conflicts in many settings. It is amplified in the Guantinamo
cases where the system is viewed as, and ultimately adjudged to be,
fundamentally unfair. See SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, supra note 5; Mark
Denbeaux & Christa Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-Client Relationship in
Guantdnamo Bay, 30 FORDHAM. INT'L L.J. 491, 491 (2007); Margareth
Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1195, 1195 (2005); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7. Ultimately there
was no conflict of interest. See p. 495 infra.
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there were no existing criminal charges, there could not be a full
discussion of disposition until the charges were concretized which
they expected would be in April 2004. Hicks and the lawyers soon
realized that a guilty plea was not an appropriate resolution, as
there appeared to be no options to secure release within the
military commission system, nor could the lawyers wait for the
resolution of the civil cases that challenged the legality of the
military commissions. 52 "It would take years," Mori later said,
"and David would still languish at Guantnamo subject to abuse
that is now well documented. 5
3
With no meaningful recourse in the military commissions,
Hicks' legal team shifted their focus to the broader political
context. They strategized that the route to securing Hicks's
release would be primarily through the court of public opinion.
They would, of course, continue to zealously advocate in the
commissions and in the United States courts, but they knew that
the Hicks ca.se had to be brought to the Australian people, as well.
Only they could put pressure on their government to acknowledge
the necessity for a meaningful legal process that conformed to
requirements of law.54
It was daunting to overcome the public's perception of David
Hicks because there was a strong and loud sentiment in Australia
52. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
53. Mori Interview, supra note 30. Mori's assessment was borne out by
events. Despite Supreme Court rulings in Rasul v. Bush, 452 U.S. 466, and
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, many Guantdnamo detainees still
languish without ability to appear in fair proceedings. See, e.g., David
Bowker & David Kaye, Guantdnamo by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2007, at A15 (noting that as of publication, over three hundred detainees
remained at the camp, and not a single one had gone to trial); William
Glaberson, U.S. Mulls New Status Hearings for Guantdnamo Inmates, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A16 (placing number of detainees at 330). In early
February of 2008, the government announced military commission charges
against six "high value" detainees. See William Glaberson, 6 at Guantdnamo
Said To Face Trial in 9/11 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at Al. It has since
dropped the case of one, Mohammed al-Qahtani, without explanation.
Qahtani's military lawyer suspects this is because the evidence that would
have been used against him was "derived by torture." William Glaberson,
Case Against 9/11 Detainee Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008. The
proceedings in Qahtani's case clearly demonstrate the "heads I win, tails you
lose" logic of the military commissions: The fact that he is not being tried
means simply that Qahtani can continue to expect indefinite detention at
Guantdnamo.
54. LASRY, supra note 2, at 16-17.
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that Hicks was a dangerous and high-level terrorist. 5 Ultimately
the blame for this sentiment was put on the United States' release
of a photo of Hicks with a rocket launcher that implied that he
was at a terrorist training camp. There was widespread and
consistent publication of this photo in Australia. In fact, the photo
was from his 1999 training with NATO allies in Albania. As Mori
stated:
Unfortunately the photo makes it appear as if he is firing
a rocket launcher. If they showed the whole picture,
you'd see there is nothing in it, it's just the tube. I have
my pictures in my military books, I'm holding my
machine gun on my waist, and everybody's has got their
buddy picture. 56
Media perception of Hicks had to be reversed.
Mori, who had only spoken to the media once before in his
career, decided that such public comment was essential to zealous
representation of his client. He discussed the idea of media
commentary with military colleagues. He was nervous. Up to
that point, no military lawyer had publicly criticized the military
commissions. They said "are you sure that you want to do this?
5 7
But Mori reasoned that the government itself had made his client
a media case, 58 and that Hicks therefore had to be defended in the
media-particularly because there was no actual court in which to
do so.59
55. See id. at [6.51-.52.].
56. Enough Rope with Andrew Denton (ABC television broadcast Aug. 14,
2006) (transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcript
s/s1709428.htm).
57. Mori Interview, supra note 30.
58. Through frequent press releases and public statements, as in the case
of Jose Padilla, government officials had made David Hicks a household
name; the popular media and the Defense Department itself simply referred
to him as the "Australian Taliban." See Australian-Taliban To Be Handed
over to U.S. Military, CNN.coM, Dec. 14, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/12/14/ret.australia.taliban/; Kathleen T. Rhem,
Military Commission Proceedings To Resume for "Australian Taliban,'
DEFENSELINK, Sept. 21, 2005,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17250.
59. During 2004, the appointing authority slowly shifted its views on
military counsel's ability to exercise First Amendment rights and to speak to
the press. Initially, the legal affairs officer expressed skepticism about any
statements to the press. Then Mori obtained permission to give his opinion
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Mori carefully reviewed the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada. 60 Gentile and subsequent ethics
rules that protect lawyers from discipline when the public
statements about a pending case are made to overcome the
prejudicial effect of publicity not initiated by the lawyer. He and
others with whom he consulted believed that Mori's press
statements were necessary to overcome the severe prejudice
caused by the government's release of numerous statements and
the resulting articles. 61
The defense launched a three-country media strategy in
Australia, Great Britain, and the United States, including a
frontal attack on the system that would be used to try Hicks. Mori
traveled to Australia numerous times in early 2004 and proceeded
to speak out strongly against the legal regime in Guantdnamo
Bay. He believed that it was essential for Australians to
understand the Guant6namo system that its government
supported. His March 2004 trip made him a "minor celebrity."62
A self-described apolitical person, he said of the tribunals, "It
offends my understanding of what justice is that's been ingrained
in me by the Marine Corps and by my legal training."63
In April 2004, he surprised an audience of Oxford University
students with his candor when he spoke out, along with military
lawyers Lieutenant Commander Swift and Major Mark Bridges,
and denounced the tribunals. He told them that "the system is not
set up to produce even the appearance of a fair trial," and declared
that they were "kangaroo courts."64 He argued that Hicks should
be tried in conformity with international legal standards, or else
returned to Australia. 65  Mori also spoke at public rallies in
Australia. His statements and speeches harshly criticizing the
on the rules and procedures of the military commissions but was not
permitted to make more specific comments about Guant~namo or the Hicks
case. As the Hicks case began to receive significant media attention, these
restrictions were relaxed. See Mori Interview, supra note 30.
60. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6.
61. Mori Interview, supra note 30; Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
62. Neil A. Lewis, Military's Lawyers for Detainees Put Tribunals on
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at Al.
63. Raymond Bonner, Marine Defends Guantdnamo Detainee, and
Surprises Australians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 13.
64. Neil A. Lewis, Military Lawyers for Detainees Put Tribunals on Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at Al.
65. Id.
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tribunals rattled his superiors. 66 He still confined his comments
to the lack of fundamental fairness in the commission process,
however, and was careful not to discuss conditions of confinement
or the specific facts of the Hicks case.
The defense worked closely with the human rights community
in Australia. Geoff Robertson, one of Australia's highest profile
human rights lawyers, challenged the Howard government for not
demanding the release of an Australian citizen and said that it
could face war crimes for "willfully depriving a prisoner of war of
the right of a fair and regular trial.
67
Despite the media attention, the Australian government
would not heed any requests that it should demand a fair legal
process or the return of its citizen. Prime Minister Howard's
rationale was that they could not bring him home because there
was no crime that he could be charged with in Australia. The
Howard government believed that the Bush administration had
the situation "under control. 68
By spring 2004, Mori had become a minor celebrity in
Australia. He visited regularly and his interviews appeared
frequently. One reporter for a major national television network
said that news accounts "compared Major Mori to Tom Cruise,
who played a valiant military defense lawyer at Guantdnamo in
the film 'A Few Good Men."' The Aussies loved him. "Mori has
come to represent everything about Americans that Aussies love
to admire."69
In the United States Mori took reporters to the Lincoln
Memorial in Washington D.C. to talk about the Hicks case.
Though Mori's statements were confined to criticism of the
commissions, his public stance and participation in rallies were
angering his superiors.
April through June 2004 were watershed months for Hicks
and Gitmo detainees. In April 2004, after the Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in Rasul v. Bush, the government decided to
permit habeas corpus lawyers into Guantdnamo and leaked
66. Mori Interview, supra note 30.
67. Geoffrey Robertson, In Thrall to the Bush Lawyers, THE AGE, Aug. 17,
2006, http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/in-thrall-to-the-bush
lawyers/2006/08/16/1155407878903.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
68. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
69. Nothing but an Echo, supra note 16.
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information about the conditions under which the detainees were
held.70 The Abu Ghraib scandal was front-page news and lead to
subsequent allegations and investigations of abuses in military
prisons.71 In June of 2004, the Supreme Court decided Rasul v.
Bush, declaring that detainees had the right to judicial review,
and the infamous "Torture Memo" was leaked to the press.
72
Slowly Dratel and Mori began to speak more openly with the press
about the facts of Hicks's confinement and his case.
In June 2004 official charges were finally filed against Hicks.
These charges were unknown to the law of war and "inherently
flawed. '7 3 First, even though Hicks was an Australian who owed
no formal allegiance to the United States, he was charged with
"aiding the enemy." He was also charged with the crime of
conspiracy-which the Supreme Court noted in the Hamdan case
was "not a recognized violation of a law of war"74-and of
attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent.
75
Hicks was arraigned on the charges in August 2004 and
preliminary motions were argued in October 2004. The day after
arguments on the Hicks motions, the entire proceeding was stayed
as a consequence of the District Court's ruling in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld that the military commission were violative of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 76 Once again, Hicks had no
legal recourse in the military commissions.
Relying upon Hamdan, the defense filed an amended
complaint in federal court and in the military commissions
attacking the structure and procedures of the commissions. These
cases were stayed pending resolution of the Hamdan case. The
Howard government, publicly criticized for its position in the
Hicks case, said that the defense lawyers bore responsibility for
70. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
71. Thom Shanker & Jacques Steinberg, The Struggle for Iraq: Captives;
Bush Voices 'Disgust'at Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at
Al.
72. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo
Says Torture 'May Be Justified,' WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 13, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html;
The Military Archipelago, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A30.
73. LASRY, supra note 2, 4.1.
74. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 563.
75. LASRY, supra note 2, 4.1.
76. 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
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the delay.7 7
By this time, however, the public perception of Howard's
criticisms of the Hicks team had shifted. This resulted, in part,
from comments from Lex Lasry, the prominent Australian lawyer
who had attended the October 2004 preliminary hearings as an
independent observer and representative of the Law Council of
Australia. Upon his return to Australia, he roundly condemned
the proceedings. 78 This provided impetus for the involvement of
the established legal community.
79
The case had now become of widespread concern to the
Australians as the public became increasingly knowledgeable
about Hicks's case. With the shift in public perception and the
pressure on the Howard government to utilize its "moral
authority" to insure that the government's "integrity was not
compromised by its support of [the military commission] process,"
the lawyers could now hopefully engage in behind the scenes
negotiations with the government.8 0 David McLeod and Michael
Griffin, military reserve lawyers with private practices, became
Australian counsel to the Hicks case.
8 1
While pursuing negotiations in Australia and with legal
proceedings stayed in the United States, the defense turned to the
British legal system. During one GTMO meeting with Mori and
Griffin, the lawyers learned that Hicks's grandparents were
British citizens. Britain had recently changed its laws so that
Hicks could now obtain British citizenship based upon his lineage.
During 2005, the legal team secured the services of solicitors and
barristers in London to file for Hicks's citizenship. The British
government had demanded and successfully secured the release of
nine of its citizens from Gitmo, and the legal team hoped that
77. LASRY, supra note 2, 3.38. The independent examiner concluded
that this was "nonsense and demonstrates why Australia's moral authority
has been compromised by the attitude of the Australian government." Id. at
3.38.
78. Hicks Trial 'Shambolic,' THE AGE, June 24, 2007, http://www.
theage.com.au/news/nationalhicks-trial-shambolic/2007/0724/118504308874
.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1. Lasry's basic biography is available on
the University of Sydney's website.
http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/event/55.html.
79. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
80. Id.
81. These lawyers replaced Steve Kenny. See supra note 34.
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when Hicks obtained citizenship, it would do so for him. 82
In December 2005, the British High Court, over the
government's objection, ordered that Hicks should be registered as
a British citizen.8 3 The British Home Office appealed numerous
times, and the High Court finally ordered that it would not allow
additional appeals.84 The Home Office complied and "secretly"
made Hicks a citizen while in his cell at Guant~namo.8 5 The next
day the British Home Secretary personally revoked citizenship.8 6
The defense then filed a legal action that was never resolved.8 7
The Hicks citizenship issue led to increased awareness of the
Hicks case in Britain, and exacerbated public concern in
Australia.
In the summer of 2005, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
82. U.K. Guantdnamo Four To Be Released, BBC NEWS, Dec. 8, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/7133760.stm. For a BBC News
comprehensive timeline, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6241991.stm
(five British detainees released on March 19, 2004). See also 'Delight' at
Release of Guantdnamo Men, BBC NEWS, Mar. 11, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/3500156.stm (detailing release of the
"Tipton Three"-which included Rasul-and two others); Jane Holroyd,
Government 'Pushed' for Hicks Trial, THE AGE, Sept. 27, 2005,
http://www.theage.com
.aulnews/worldlfather-welcomes-david-hicks-trialdate/2005/09/27/1127586827
641.html (the Australian Foreign affairs minister, Alexander Downey,
claimed that the attorneys were trying to "circumvent" justice by attempting
to gain a British passport for Hicks).
83. See Annabel Crabb, Hicks Wins Citizenship Fight, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, May 7, 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/court-puts-hicks-
back-on-track-for-british-citizenship200605/06/1146335967064.html
[hereinafter Crabb, Hicks Wins]; Annabel Crabb, Law Strips Hicks of UK
Citizenship in Hours, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 20, 2006,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/law-strips-hicks-of-uk-citizenship-in-
hours/2006/08/19/1155408075077.html [hereinafter Crabb, Law Strips Hicks].
84. Crabb, Hicks Wins, supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. Jeannie Shawl, Gitmo Detainee Stripped of UK Citizenship One Day
After Request Granted, JURIST, Aug. 19, 2006, http://64.41.216.61/paperchase/
2006/08/gitmo-detainee-hicks-stripped-of-uk.php (noting that the citizenship-
stripping was pursuant to the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of
2006 which allows the secretary to "deprive a person of citizenship if the
Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public
good." See Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, S. 56 (1), available
at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga-20060013_en_1#56.
87. Upon defense motion, the court ordered a hearing on the issue of
whether Hicks had been tortured. The hearing was never held because of the
resolution of Hicks's case in the military commission. Dratel Interview,
supra note 39 (motions on file).
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court in Hamdan thus permitting the resumption of the military
commissions.88 The hope faded for a negotiated return of Hicks to
Australia, and the Howard government pressed for a hearing
date. 8 9  First scheduled for September 2005, the date was
adjourned until November 2005, with the Howard government
maintaining that the defense lawyers were responsible for the
delay. 90 The proceedings were soon stayed again when the United
States Supreme Court then granted certiorari in Hamdan.
During 2006, the Australian public clamored for the Howard
government to press for Hicks's return. 9 1 There were rallies
throughout the country and regular press accounts of Hick's
unlawful detention. Events had progressed to the extent that
Dratel and Mori, in an April 2006 trip to Australia, had meetings
to discuss the rules and conditions for a transfer agreement if
Hicks was returned to Australia. The defense team also engaged
lawyers who began a legal action in Australia to order Hicks
returned.
92
In June 2006, the historic Hamdan decision, which declared
the military commissions to be violative of the Geneva
Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, nullified
the military commission proceedings against Hicks. The Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) was passed in response to
Hamdan.9
3
Mori remained on the offensive in the media, attacking the
structure and proceedings established under the new MCA. In
88. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
89. Holroyd, supra note 80.
90. LASRY, supra note 2, 3.38.
91. See, for example, Seven Out of Ten Australians Want Hicks Home,
CANABERRA TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006; Free-Hicks Rallies Roll On, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 11, 2006; Australians Believe Hicks Should Get Fair Trial
Now, TOWNSVILLE BULLETIN, Sept. 16, 2006. In November of 2006, the Upper
House of the Australian Senate passed a motion urging the government to
intervene in Hicks's case. Senate Wants Hicks Home, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov.
10, 2006. The sheer volume of coverage received by Hicks in 2006 is also
worth noting: A search of Australian newspapers in which Hicks' name
appeared in headlines reveals 408 hits for that year, with entire articles
devoted to minute developments in the status of his case, his physical
condition, and even his father's nomination for "Father of the Year."
92. A hearing on that case was schedule for May 2007 and became moot
upon the resolution of Hicks' case in the military commission. Dratel
Interview, supra note 39 (motions on file).
93. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w (2007).
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August 2006, he went on a lecture tour in Australia on behalf of
Hicks, attending a rally in Adelaide and leading a march to the
office of the Australian Foreign Minister. He charged the Bush
administration with creating another illegal system that violated
Hicks's rights and reiterated that the new military commission
system-like the old one-was "rigged for convictions only."
94
Speaking at an almost sold-out event organized by the Australian
Lawyers' Alliance at the Brisbane Convention Center, Mori noted
that "providing information to the public and elected officials had
to become part of defending [Hicks] .,,95 "I'm sure some ministers in
the Australian Government would just like us to go away quietly
and let David get done over by an unfair system," Mori remarked,
"but that wouldn't be doing justice to an Australian citizen."96
Howard's approval ratings continue to decline. Especially
when joined with the issue of the Iraq war, Hicks's case seemed to
symbolize the Howard government's willingness to acquiesce to
American demands-a vulnerability particularly noted in
Australia's 2007 elections that linked him to the increasingly
unpopular President Bush.97 In Australia in November 2006,
Mori attended the signing of the Fremantle Declaration, a
"declaration demanding the Commonwealth take action to ensure
Guantdnamo Bay detainee David Hicks is immediately brought to
trial."9  All attorneys general of the States and territories of
94. Hicks' Lawyer to Meet with Ministers in Canberra, AUSTRALIAN
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 13, 2006.
95. Stealing a March: Hicks' Lawyer Pounds PR Trail To Win Over
Hearts and Minds, COURIER MAIL, November 14, 2006.
96. Id.
97. Steve Lewis, Newspoll: Rudd Gains Ground on Howard, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21102080-601,00.html
("[a]s John Howard prepares to freshen up his ministry, voters have also
criticised the Government's handling of the war in Iraq, with more than 70
percent saying it will influence their vote. The Government's handling of
terror suspect David Hicks has also been denounced by voters .... " Id.);
Nick Bryant, Howard Faces Election Year Battle, BBC NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/asia-pacific/6361361.stm (noting "one of the main
effects of the row over Iraq has been to bind Mr. Howard even closer to
George W. Bush, a U.S. president deeply unpopular in many quarters of the
Australian electorate. Whether it is his reluctance to engineer the quick
release of David Hicks, an Australian imprisoned for five years without trial
at Guantdnamo Bay, or his shared stance with the Bush administration over
Kyoto, Mr. Howard would appear to be on the wrong side of public opinion.").
98. A-Gs Demand Immediate Action on Hicks Trial, AUSTL. BROAD. NEWS
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Australia attended with the pointed exception of the Federal
Attorney General, Philip Ruddock, who refused to attend. His
absence was highlighted in the press. 99
In February 2007 the charges were dismissed and two new
charges were sworn against Hicks: (1) Attempted murder in
violation of the law of war; and (2) providing material support for
terrorism. The Convening Authority for the Military Commissions
referred only the material support for terrorism charge for trial. 100
This charge was not available under the old military commissions,
but was introduced in the MCA of 2006.
Just as Hicks was about to be arraigned on these new
charges, Colonel Morris Davis, the then chief prosecutor for the
military commissions, publicly warned that Mori's "politicking" on
behalf of Hicks could result in prosecution for his actions under
Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which
forbids officers from speaking "contemptuous words" about the
President, Vice President, or Secretary of Defense.' 1  Davis
claimed, among other things, that "certainly in the U.S. it would
not be tolerated having a U.S. marine in uniform actively
inserting himself into the political process. It is very
disappointing to see that happening in Australia and if that was
one of my prosecutors, they would be held accountable."' 10 2
ONLINE, Oct. 11, 2006,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200611/si785856.htm.
99. Id.
100. See LASRY, supra note 2, 4.5. This charge had two specifications.
The first provided that Hicks intentionally provided material support or
resources to an international terrorist organization (al Qaeda) which was
engaged in hostilities against the United States. The second specification
alleged that Hicks provided that support knowing or intending that that it
would be used in preparing for or carrying out an act of terrorism. Hicks
ultimately pled only to the first specification.
101. Raymond Bonner, Terror Case Prosecutor Assails Defense Lawyer,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 2007, at A10. See 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006) ("Any
commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President,
the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a
military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Governor or
legislature of any State, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty
or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.").
102. David Nason, Mori Charges Could Be Laid After Trial, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 03, 2007, available at
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21315542-2,00.html.
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While Davis's notion that Mori could have been prosecuted 10 3
appears far-fetched-Article 88 has rarely been invoked in
military courts-martial, and only in extreme cases' 0 4-Davis's
allegations were serious enough to cause Mori to worry that he
might be impeding Hicks's case by continuing to represent him. 10 5
The defense once again went on the offensive. Dratel, in
public comment, said that Davis's threats were the "latest
example of the corrupt system that will try Hicks."10 6 Dratel and
Synder filed a motion to disqualify Davis based upon prosecutorial
misconduct. They charged:
The curious timing of Col. Davis' initial accusations ...
suggests that Col. Davis made the accusation to chill and
hinder Maj. Mori's representation of Mr. Hicks and to
derail the defense shortly before the arraignment. These
allegations diverted the defense team from preparing for
Mr. Hicks' trial, forcing them to focus instead on
assessing the potential conflict of interest between Maj.
Mori and Mr. Hicks. They also required Maj. Mori to
refrain from making public comments on behalf of Mr.
Hicks until he could obtain legal advice on the issue. 107
The threat of a court martial of Mori led to press accounts
that Hicks's case would be delayed yet again if Mori was recused
from representation.
The defense filed numerous motions all the while, negotiating
a plea bargain on favorable terms for Hicks. The anticipated plea,
of course, would be premised upon a charge that was without
103. See, e.g., Morris D. Davis, AWOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-
davis10dec10,0,2446661.story (ironically, Colonel Davis resigned as Chief
Prosecutor over the "politicized" nature of the military commission's
procedures and subsequently leveled his own criticisms of his former
superiors.).
104. See Michael J. Davidson, Contemptuous Speech Against the President,
ARMY LAW. 1, 2-3 (July 1999). See also Luban, supra note 7.
105. Tom Allard, Hicks Trial at Risk If Mori Taken Off Case, THE AGE,
Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2007/03/04/1172943276209
.html.
106. Id.
107. Defense Motion for Appropriate Relief, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 19
March 2007 (on file with author). This was one of eighteen motions that
remained unresolved at the time of the Hicks plea. Mori Interview, supra
note 30.
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foundation under the law of war-the very point made by the
defense in one of its motions to dismiss. Nine eminent lawyers
had provided affidavits to the commission to the effect that there
was no such crime as material support for terrorism under the law
of war, and that in any case, it was clearly "retrospective in its
application to Hicks and was a recently invented and new war
crime."108 Additional arguments provided convincing support that
the charge was "brought and prosecuted in violation of
international law."'10
9
On March 26, 2007, Hicks pled guilty to providing material
support for terrorism, notwithstanding the fact that the charge
was arguably not sustainable and that the proceedings were held
before a body without legal authority and lacking in fundamental
due process. 1
10
The proceedings demonstrated the arbitrariness of the
process.1 1 ' Two of Hicks's three attorneys were dismissed by the
Judge at the outset. Rebecca Snyder was dismissed because the
Judge claimed that she was not on active duty and therefore could
not qualify as military counsel, nor did he interpret the MCA to
permit her to remain as civilian counsel. 1 12 The judge would not
108. LASRY, supra note 2, 4.14 (emphasis added).
109. Id. 4.16.
110. The defense entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970) based upon stipulated facts. An Alford plea does not require
the defendant to state that he is guilty. Rather it permits the entry of a
guilty plea with a statement acknowledging that, based upon the
particularized facts, the prosecution could prove their case beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Alford plea avoids the issue of whether an attorney
may assist a client in the entry of a guilty plea to a charge it "knows" to be
not sustainable under law. Zealous advocacy for a criminal defendant should
permit the entry of a guilty plea whether or not the attorney believes the
charge is sustainable; however, this is an issue that has not been adequately
addressed in legal ethics literature. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L.
REV. 73 (1995); MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS (3d ed. 2004) (arguing that ethics rules are rooted in the
moral values expressed in the Bill of Rights, not in moral philosophy.) Id. at
8); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not To Plead: Effective Assistance and
Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841 (1998); Albert W. Alschuler,
The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975);
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909 (1992).
111. LASRY, supra note 2 (calling the procedures "ad hoc").
112. He also ruled that she could not qualify as civilian counsel and
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permit Dratel to appear as counsel unless he would sign a consent
agreement to be bound by all rules, including those which were
not yet in existence. Dratel's argument that he could not sign a
"blank check" but that he would sign an agreement to be bound by
"all applicable rules presently in existence" was not acceptable to
the Judge.'1 3 Dratel left the courtroom as Hicks stated, "I am
shocked. I just lost another lawyer."11 4 Mori remained at Hicks's
side in the proceedings and ultimately entered a guilty plea in
proceedings described by the independent observer as
"shambolic."' 1 5
The plea agreement, worked out at the highest levels of
government without knowledge of the prosecutor, 1 6 provided for a
sentence that permitted Hicks to return to Australia to serve only
nine remaining months.'1 7  Hicks also agreed to refrain from
suggested she remain as a "consultant." Hicks stated that he wanted her to
be his attorney, not a consultant. For a full account of the legal arguments,
see LASRY, supra note 2, 5.9-5.14.
113. Id. 5.15-5.25.
114. Id. 5.24.
115. Hicks Trial Shambolic, supra note 78.
116. The deal was negotiated between Mori and Susan Crawford, the "top
military commission official" and one of Vice President Cheney's former
deputies-notably, without prosecutor Morris Davis' input. Josh White,
Australian's Plea Deal Was Negotiated Without Prosecutors, WASH. POST, Apr.
1, 2007, at A07. Vice President Dick Cheney had visited with Australian
Prime Minister John Howard in early 2007, during which they discussed the
Hicks case. The visit occurred in the context of wide protests over Hicks's
treatment and a promise by Howard to press the issue. See, e.g., U.S. Vice-
President Pledge on Hicks, BBC NEWS, Feb. 24, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/1/hilworldlasia-pacific/6392051.stm; Cheney Visit Prompts Protests, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/
cheney-visit-prompts-protests/2007/02/22/1171733922521.html; James
Grubel, Australia To Press Cheney on Guantdnamo Trial for Hicks, REUTERS,
Feb. 19, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSSYD10287
820070219; White, supra note 13.. One Australian newspaper reports that a
deal was directly brokered between Vice President Cheney and Prime
Minister Howard during his visit to the country, even though the Australian
government denied it. 'Deal' That Freed Hicks, THE AGE, Oct. 23, 2007,
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/cheney-howard-deal-freed-
hicks/2007/10/23/1192941024047.html.
117. Though Hicks was sentenced to seven years, the plea bargain
permitted him to serve only nine remaining months after what had been five
years in American custody. He was released on December 29, 2007. Terror
Detainee Back in Australia, NYTIMES.COM, May 20, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/world/asia/20hicks.html; Raymond
Bonner, Australian Terrorism Detainee Leaves Prison, NYTIMES.coM, Dec. 29,
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speaking to the media for one year and, notably, to make a
statement that he "has never been illegally treated," along with a
promise not to file any lawsuits pursuant to his treatment in
Guantdnamo. 118  The "deal helped Australian Prime Minister
John Howard, a U.S. ally, avoid a bruising domestic
controversy." 11 9 The case was widely reported in the media. The
U.S. Department of Defense issued a press release claiming,
"Military commissions are regularly constituted courts, affording
all the necessary judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples for purposes of common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions."'120
The Military Commissions spokeswoman said that the Hicks
case showed that Guantdnamo commissions offer a "fair,
legitimate and transparent forum," 12 1 while the Washington Post
reported that the guilty plea "marks a victory for the Bush
administration."
' 12 2
Hick's father's statement was, perhaps, more representative
of the public's view: Hicks pled guilty, he said, just to "escape the
isolated prison."12 3 The press reported the dismay of military
authorities when the imposed seven year sentence was reduced to
nine months in accordance with the plea bargain.
124
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Case, NYTIMES.COM, May 31, 2007, http:l/www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/
washingtonl31gitmo.html?ex=1333080000&en=5a6690d157e5ca31&ei=5124
&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink.
119. Scott Horton, Military Lawyers and the Gitmo Commissions,
HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 30, 2007, http:/Jharpers.org/archive/2007/10/hbc-
90001549.
120. Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge at Guantdnamo Trial, U.S.
Department of Defense, March 30, 2007 (http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10678.)
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April 1, 2007.
122. Josh White, Australian's Guilty Plea Is First at Guantdnamo, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyr/content/article/
2007/03/26/AR2007032602439.html.
123. Australian Guantdnamo Detainee Hicks Sentenced to 9 Months After
Plea Deal, FOxNEWS.COM, Mar. 30, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,262960,00.html.
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Association in a ceremony where he was touted for advocacy called
"fearless and passionate."'125 In the past year, he has received
numerous awards for dedicated, zealous lawyering. 126 And while
Major Mori avoided prosecution, his zealous advocacy was not
rewarded by the military. He was reassigned to a base in San
Diego as soon as Hicks left Guantinamo and has been passed over
for promotion twice since taking on his case. 127 In January 2008
he was sent to Iraq.
LAWYERING IN HINDSIGHT
Mori and the defense team undertook a remarkable challenge
in what was described by the Australian Law Council's
Independent Observer as an "inherently oppressive and coercive
system" where "liberty is a bargaining chip that the State may use
to avoid accountability and buy impunity."'128
Recognizing that the case would be resolved in the political
arena, a self-described apolitical military lawyer employed a
strategy that is often described as "political lawyering" or "cause
lawyering."'129 Engaging in a relatively novel tactic for a military
lawyer, Mori extensively utilized the media to overcome negative
public perception of his client and promote the need for a fair
process. The media strategy assisted the international campaign
of human rights organizations and activists. Mori continued his
125. Honorary Membership for Major Mori, NEWS.COM.AU, June 29, 2007,
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21990165-1702,00.html.
126. Id.
127. Mori Reassigned to 'Top Gun' Marine Base, AuSTL. BROAD. NEWS
ONLINE, May 22, 2007,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/05/22/1929231.htm.
128. LASRY, supra note 2, 7.3.
129. These terms are defined in varied ways and often used
interchangeably. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An
Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 287 (1996) (deliberate efforts to use
law to change society or to alter allocations of power); David Luban, The
Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 955 (1995) (articulating a theory of "moral activism" in which "lawyers
have substantial moral responsibilities to parties other than the client.");
Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of
Legal Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client
Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 493 (1996) (arguing that individual
client representation may be "cause lawyering"); Etienne, supra note 51 at
1196-97 (defining cause lawyers as those who "use the law as a means of
creating social change in addition to a means of helping individual clients.").
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highly visible public advocacy even when threatened with
prosecution that could have been a disqualifying conflict of
interest.
Mori and the defense team successfully coordinated the legal
strategy with the political one across three continents as the
landscape shifted during five years. 130 They did so understanding
that Hicks's situation presented potential conflicts. While the
lawyers necessarily mounted a highly visible campaign to bring
Hicks before a tribunal, all the lawyers believed that the military
commissions were unlawful and that its processes were
fundamentally unfair. They did not want to legitimate those
commissions by participation in the process, especially because
their client would be the first detainee to participate in a military
commission. They correctly could predict that the U.S.
government would claim legitimacy and victory by Hicks's
participation and guilty plea. Moreover, the lawyers did not
believe that the ultimate charge against Hicks was legally valid.
Nevertheless, the duty to David Hicks was paramount; the end of
his detention and his return to Australia were the goals.
These potential conflicts, present in many criminal cases and
notably in those defined as "cause lawyering," did not become
actual conflicts. Ultimately, the lawyers's goal was the traditional
one for all criminal defendants: resolution of their case on the
most favorable terms for their client. That goal was served by the
defense team's creative and effective multi-pronged strategy
employed for the "cause" of challenging the unlawful regime at
Guantdnamo Bay and upholding the rule of law. Both "causes"
were served by the Hicks guilty plea and sentence. As Dratel said:
From the outset, there was always a tension between
what we call "cause lawyering" vs. "client lawyering" and
my hope was always that we could serve the client
without undermining the cause .... As it turned out, we
achieved that even in unanticipated ways. We have done
as much as we can to demonstrate that it is an invalid
130. Similar strategies have been employed in a wide range of cases. See
e.g., Michael D. Davis & Hunter R. Clark, Thurgood Marshall: Warrior at the
Bar, Rebel on the Bench 100-12 (1992); Arthur Kinoy, RIGHTS ON TRIAL (1983);
Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantdnamo HIV Camp: The
Intersection of Politics and Litigation, 11 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 187 (1998).
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system and we hope that was achieved .... At the same
time there was disillusionment from the other side-this
is the "worst of the worst" and you are freeing him?" . ..
The "Hicks deal" is now a term of art. People say, "I want
a Hicks deal." It robbed the commissions of any
authority. 131
In these extraordinary circumstances, the judgment that the case
had to be resolved in the political arena required the zealous
lawyering undertaken by Mori and the defense team. It was,
perhaps, the only way to provide meaningful legal representation
at all.
131. Dratel Interview, supra note 39.
